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EMPLOYMENT OR SELF EMPLOYMENT:  
A DYNAMIC UTILITY MAXIMIZING MODEL 
  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a considerable literature on careers from a variety of disciplines that focuses 
almost exclusively on job mobility patterns within and across established firms.  While 
these scholars of career mobility patterns have made a substantial contribution to our 
knowledge of career changes they have all but ignored self-employment as a career 
choice.  This is surprising as self-employed persons represent a substantial portion of a 
country’s labor force.   
This article presents a dynamic utility maximizing model of career choice between self 
employment and employment.  The model builds on previous economic models that 
suggest that jobs differ in terms of income, work required, risk involved and 
independence allowed (especially between self employment and employment).  People 
are believed to differ in terms of their attitudes to these job attributes, which helps explain 
why some people choose to be self employed while others choose to be employed.  While 
this previous research has increased our understanding of career choice involving self 
employment, there is an implicit assumption that a person’s attitudes to these job 
attributes are constant. 
  Research on life cycle and career stage models have indicated that as people age 
(mature) their attitudes change and this impacts their assessments and decisions.  We 
argue that as people age their attitudes towards income, work, risk and independence 
change, as does the ability to complete the task and these changes impact their career 
choices.  We provide a dynamic model of career choice that takes into consideration the 
differences among people in terms of their initial utility toward job attributes and the 
likely changes to those attitudes as they mature. 
Specifically we argue that people differ in terms of their: initial utility for self 
employment over employment, initial utility from the assessment of the maximum 
difference in income for self employment over employment, the marginal reduction in 
utility for self employment over employment from aging, and the final utility for self 
employment over employment.  These differences between people effect the career path 
that maximizes their utility - - five optimal career paths are offered.  For example, a 
group of people with similar attitudes and maturation process may find it utility 
maximizing to begin their careers in employment but then shift to self employment for 
the middle stage of their careers and then back to employment for the final stage of their 
career.  Another group may find it utility maximizing to always be employed. 
This article makes a step towards increasing our understanding of why people 
become self employed but importantly why and when some self employed people might 
switch to employment.  We argue that this is due, in part, to people’s attitudes (their 
utility or disutility weights) and that these attitudes change over time impacting career 
choice.  However, we are not deterministic and point out that attitudes can be changed by 
factors other than time, for example, education or access to resources and therefore there 
is much interesting research that still needs to be conducted. 
EMPLOYMENT OR SELF EMPLOYMENT:  
A DYNAMIC UTILITY MAXIMIZING MODEL 
  
ABSTRACT 
This article presents a dynamic utility maximizing model of career choice between self 
employment and employment that takes into consideration the differences among people 
in terms of their initial utility toward job attributes and the likely changes to those utility 
weights as they mature.  These differences between people effect the choice of career that 
maximizes their utility and leads to five optimal career paths.  This dynamic utility 
maximizing model helps increase our understanding of why some people become self 
employed but importantly why and when some self employed switch to employment. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
There is a considerable literature on careers from a variety of disciplines (e.g., 
labor economists, organizational behaviorists and sociologists) that focuses almost 
exclusively on job mobility patterns within and across established firms (Borjas 1986; 
Carroll and Mosakowski 1987).  While these scholars of career mobility patterns have 
increased our understanding of career changes they have all but ignored self-employment 
as a career choice.  This is surprising as self-employed persons represent a substantial 
portion of the labor force (almost 12% according to Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; 
Manser and Picot 1999).  There is a need for more career research on self employment. 
Recently the application of economic principles to the intention to be self 
employed has made a significant contribution to the field and provides a framework from 
which other scholars can build.  For example, Douglas and Shepherd (1999) represent an 
individual’s choice to be self employed by a utility maximizing model where people 
intend to be self employed when the combination of income, risk, work effort required 
and independence provides greater utility to this person than the combination of these 
attributes for the best employment option.  People differ in what gives them utility and 
this explains why some people intend to be self employed while others intend to be 
employed. 
Scholars modeling the intention to be self employed, by necessity, have held a 
number of variables constant in order to study only those parts of the decision under 
investigation.  Douglas and Shepherd (1999) assume that a person’s attitudes do not 
change over time and therefore an intention to be self employed (or employed) is 
relatively stable.  We argue that this assumption may not always hold and this could 
significantly effect the intention to be self employed and consequently the career path 
that a person may follow over their life time.  For example, studies based on life cycle 
and career stage models have indicated that determinants of job attitudes change (Lee and 
Wilbur 1985) and therefore a person’s intention to be self employed may also change 
over time.  This discussion leads to this article’s research question: What affect does 
changing attitudes with age have on a person’s career path, i.e., the choice between being 
self employed and employed?  
Conceptually, past research has relied on the assumption that entrepreneurship is 
associated with a stable set of individual characteristics (Carroll and Mosakowski 1987) 
including attitudes (e.g., Douglas and Shepherd 1999).  In this article we use 
deterministic dynamic programming to investigate career intentions (self employed or 
employed) over time. Mathematical models have already been used to investigate career 
paths[1] and while this approach has its own limitations it does not assume temporal 
                                                 
[1] For example, White (1970) utilizes Markov models to investigate the constraints on 
men’s opportunity to move within large organizations.  Lévesque and MacCrimmon 
(1997) utilize dynamic programming to investigate the decision to be self employed 
equilibrium.  Therefore, not only can we address the question of why some people choose 
self employment over employment but also investigate why a person may change in and 
out of self employment and when these changes will occur.  We believe a dynamic 
investigation of optimal career paths will make a contribution to both the 
entrepreneurship and career literatures.   
This study proceeds as follows:  First, an economic perspective of entrepreneurship as a 
utility maximizing response is reviewed.  Second, this static perspective of career choice 
is supplemented with knowledge (and assumptions) about the way people’s attitudes 
typically change over time.  This discussion leads to a number of assumptions that will be 
used in the formulation of our dynamic model of career choice.  Third, the dynamic 
model is formulated and optimal career paths are described.  A sensitivity analysis for 
key parameters is presented.  Finally, implications of this article for scholars and 
practitioners are offered. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) propose that entrepreneurship research can be 
classified into how entrepreneurs act (i.e., what it is they do); what happens when 
entrepreneurs act (i.e., what are the outcomes of their actions); and why people choose to 
act as entrepreneurs (i.e., what motivates them to be entrepreneurs).  Economic theory 
has been used in the entrepreneurship domain primarily to investigate what happens when 
entrepreneurs act and how they do it (Herbert and Link 1988; Barreto 1989) - - the first 
two classifications of entrepreneurship research.  Only recently have scholars turned their 
attention toward an economics perspective of why people are motivated to be 
entrepreneurs. 
Baumol (1990) suggests that people are motivated by the reward structure in the 
economy - - the rules of the game that govern the pay off.  Campbell (1992) proposes that 
the pay off can be evaluated using a expected net present value (ENPV) and that a person 
                                                                                                                                                 
taking into consideration the entrepreneur’s tolerance for work and the new venture’s 
rate of return. 
will be motivated to be an entrepreneur when the ENPV of profit from entrepreneurship 
is positive (profit includes a monetary evaluation of psychic costs and benefits).  Whereas, 
Eisenhauer’s (1995) economic model of the decision to be an entrepreneur is based on 
expected utility derived from income and the working conditions of employment versus 
self employment. 
Douglas and Shepherd (1999), following Baumol (1990), Gifford (1993) and Eisenhauer 
(1995), demonstrated that the individual’s choice to be a self employed can be 
represented as a utility-maximizing decision.  They showed that both employment and 
self employment ‘jobs’ can be characterized by their level of income, work effort, risk, 
independence, and other working conditions (net perquisites) and an individual’s choice 
between the best available alternative in employment and the best alternative in self 
employment depends on his/her preference (or aversion) for each of these job attributes. 
Douglas and Shepherd (1999) argue that in the context of career choice, an individual 
expects to gain utility from income (derived from the goods and services which he/she 
can buy with that income), disutility from work effort and risk bearing, and either utility 
or disutility from independence and other working conditions.  They model the 
individual’s choice of career path out to an individual’s time horizon by defining a career 
path as a single job held throughout the planning period, or two or more jobs in sequence 
over that same planning period.  Thus they state:  
                                                         Uij = F (Yij, Wij, Rij, Iij, 
Oij)                                                     (1) 
where   Uij represents the utility anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
            Yij represents the income anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
            Wij represents the work effort anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
            Rij represents the risk anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
            Iij represents the independence anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
Oij represents the net perquisites anticipated in the ith period from the jth job; 
i = 1, 2, 3, …, n represents the different periods out to the time horizon (n), and j 
= 1, 2, 3, …, m represents the different jobs available in any period.  An individual 
will envision k = 1, 2, 3, …, z career paths, each comprising a single job or a 
sequence of jobs from the present moment out to the time horizon and will 
choose among the “z” career paths, such that his/her expected utility is 
maximized.  
We define utility as the product of a person’s positive attitude towards an 
attribute (which we call a utility weight) and the absolute value of that 
attribute.  Disutility is the product of a person’s negative attitude towards an attribute 
(which we call a disutility weight) and the absolute value of that attribute.  The overall 
utility of a career option is the combination of the utilities and/or disutilities for each of 
the attributes in the Douglas and Shepherd (1999) career maximization model.  For 
example, at any age a person’s attitude toward risk (e.g., high risk aversion) can be 
thought of as a disutility weight and is multiplied to the absolute risk of the career 
alternative in order to ascertain that person’s disutility from risk.  This disutility from risk 
must be combined with the disutility from work, utility from independence, utility from 
income and the utility or disutility of net perquisites in order to ascertain the overall 
utility of a career alternative.  The overall utility for this career option is compared to 
other available options and the one with the highest utility is chosen.  This leads to our 
first assumption to be used in model formulation: 
Assumption 1: People choose a career path that maximizes their overall utility. 
  
However, as described above, a critical assumption of the Douglas and Shepherd 
(1999) model is that people’s attitudes do not change over time and therefore a career 
decision will only be changed when the attributes of the decision change (holding 
opportunity and resources constant).  While this assumption was necessary in order to 
develop their model and advance our understanding of a person’s motivation to be self 
employed, if relaxed, will likely provide additional insight.  We know that as we grow 
older our attitudes to many things change.  We argue that such attitudinal changes over a 
person’s lifetime might help explain their career path over time including movements into 
and/or out of self employment.  We now explore each of the attitudes (utility and 
disutility weights) in the Douglas and Shepherd (1999) model (ability and income; 
attitudes to risk; work effort; and independence), how these (dis)utility weights likely 
effect a career choice between self employment and employment and how these 
(dis)utility weights likely change over time.  Such a discussion forms the basis for a 
series of assumptions that will be used in an optimization model of peoples’ career paths 
over time. 
  
Ability and Income 
The term ‘ability’ is used here to encompass all the skills possessed by an individual 
which contribute to his/her productivity on the job, and include opportunity recognition 
and screening, business planning, creative problem solving, strategic marketing, financial 
management, human resource management, and leadership and persuasive skills.  The 
higher the ability the more valuable the person is to an employer or the more profitable 
their own business will be (all else equal).  Douglas and Shepherd (1999) demonstrate 
that the ability of the employee is reflected in the height of the profit curve with a ‘more-
able’ person generating a higher profit curve (for the employer’s business or their own 
business, all other things being equal).  This argument on the relationship between ability 
and income has empirical support (Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Card and Lemieux 1996).   
So how does this relationship between ability and income influence a person’s career 
decision between being self employed and employed?  To be self employed requires 
considerable and diverse abilities relative to those required to be employed (Baumol 
1990; Holmes and Schmitz 1990; Gifford 1993) and those that are self employed 
typically earn more than those that are employed (Wright and Perrone 1977).  Therefore, 
those that have higher skills and/or those that have a greater desire for income are more 
likely to choose self employment.   
However, are ability and the desire for income stable characteristics of a person?  We 
argue that they are not.  Ability often increases with age.  Age provides an opportunity to 
gain more knowledge through experience, which often translates to expertise 
(performance) (Schwartz and Griffin 1986; Mumpower, Phillips, Renn and Uppuluri 
1987).  While age can increase one’s ability which in turn increases that person’s income, 
we argue that the relative importance of income in their career decision decreases and 
shifts to other characteristics of the job such as independence (as will be discussed 
below).  The above discussion leads to the following assumption to be used in the 
development of a dynamic utility maximizing model:[2]
Assumption 2: (a) Income increases as ability increases. (b) Income is less 
in employment than in self employment. (c) Ability increases at a 
decreasing rate with age. (d) The utility weight for income decreases at an 
increasing rate with age.  
  
Attitudes to Work Effort 
Work effort is defined as the product of time spent working and an index of work 
intensity (Douglas and Shepherd 1999).  It is generally accepted that people are averse to 
work (a disutility weight for work).  For example, scholars of agency theory assume 
that people are averse to work effort with differing degrees of aversion (e.g., 
Alchian and Demsetz 1972; MacDonald 1984).  A person with a higher degree of 
work aversion (i.e., higher disutility weight) derives greater marginal disutility from 
a job that requires additional hours of work and greater intensity of effort than 
someone with less work aversion.  Therefore the level of aversion to work will 
influence the type of career chosen (Furnham and Koritsas 1990; Douglas and 
Shepherd 1999).  We also assume that people gain greater enjoyment from 
those tasks in which they have higher ability.  Therefore, for a given job, the work 
is less onerous when one is more able. 
This relationship between the degree of work aversion and utility from one’s career likely 
influences the choice between self employment and employment as entrepreneurs 
typically must work long and hard hours and even put their business ahead of their 
personal and family life (Bird and Jellinek 1988).  While there is little research on 
how a person’s aversion to work changes as they age, we assume their aversion 
to work increases with age (e.g., a person is more willing to work eighteen hour 
days at a hectic pace immediately after graduating from school than they are just 
prior to retirement).  The above discussion leads to the following assumptions: 
                                                 
[2] For each assumption all other attributes are held constant. 
Assumption 3: (a) People are work averse - - they have a disutility weight 
for work effort. (b) The disutility weight for work effort decreases as ability 
increases. (c) Work effort is less in employment than in self employment. 
(d) The disutility weight for work effort increases at a decreasing rate with 
age. 
  
Attitudes to Risk 
The discussion thus far assumes that profit is a direct and unambiguous function of work 
effort, all other things being equal.  But when profit is an uncertain function of work 
effort, there will be an expected profit level for each level of work effort, surrounded by a 
variance of profit outcomes which may eventuate due to potential changes in consumer 
preferences, competitors’ prices and product offerings, macro-economic variables, and so 
on (Douglas and Shepherd 1999).  Such potential profit variability introduces the risk that 
the employee (or the self employed) may expend additional effort without any additional 
remuneration for that effort. People will not generally seek out extra risk without 
compensation and therefore can be considered risk averse (i.e., they have a negative 
utility weight for risk).  However, it appears that people are less averse to risk at those 
tasks for which they have high ability (Heath and Tversky 1991). 
Furthermore, while there is heterogeneity among employment options on the level of risk 
(an employee typically receives a salary or a wage that may or may not have 
commissions and bonuses attached to that salary) self employment typically represents a 
more risky endeavor (Duchesneau and Gartner 1990).  Risk aversion has been 
found to be positively associated with age (Palsson 1996).  For example, a rise in 
average age is found to predict a rise in risk premiums (Bakshi and Chen 1994) 
and in an investigation of portfolio selection behavior, risk aversion was found to 
increase uniformly with age (Morin and Saurez 1983).  
Assumption 4: (a) People are risk averse - - they have a disutility weight for 
risk. (b) The disutility weight for risk decreases as ability increases. (c) 
Risk is less in employment than in self employment. (d) The disutility 
weight for risk increases at a decreasing rate with age. 
  
Attitudes to Independence  
Attitude to independence refers to the preference or aversion to control their own 
decision-making and confidence in one’s own abilities which allows independent 
decision making rather than frequent recourse to advisors (Douglas and Shepherd 
1999).  While some people may prefer to be directed and feel uncomfortable with the 
responsibility that comes with independence, we assume people typically have a 
preference for independence.  We further argue one’s attitude to independence becomes 
more preferring as one’s ability increases (the utility weight for independence 
increases).  A possible explanation is that decision makers receive credit for success in a 
choice that involves judgement in an area of competence but blame for failure if the 
choice involves judgement in an area of relative ignorance (Heath and Tversky 1991). 
Despite the self employed person still being answerable to stakeholders such as 
financiers and variability in the level of independence within the employment option, 
independence is typically higher in the self employment option (Bird 1989; Katz 
1994).  While there is little research on the relationship between attitudes toward 
independence and age we argue that as a person ages a preference for independence 
becomes stronger.  Empirical evidence supporting this assumption occurs with older 
nurses who assign greater importance to flexibility in their work and lesser importance to 
development, career advancement and socialization than did younger ones (Proenca and 
Shewchuk 1998).   The above discussion leads to our final assumption, which will then 
be used in the model formulation: 
Assumption 5: (a) People are independence seekers - - they have a utility 
weight for independence. (b) The utility weight for independence 
increases as ability increases. (c) Independence is less for employment 
than for self employment. (d) The utility weight for independence 
increases at a decreasing rate with age. 
  
MODEL FORMULATION 
Let t represent the age and at be an individual’s ability at t.  Ability increases at a 
decreasing rate with age (2a) and is mathematically expressed by 
                                                                                                                         (2) 
where α0 is the initial ability and α is a scaling parameter (which represents an upper 
bound on the increment in ability over time). 
Let y be the utility weight for (absolute) income, which decreases with age at an 
increasing rate (2b), that is, 
                                                                                           (3) 
To model the utility weight for income we choose the functional form 
                                                                                                                                    (4) 
where γy is the initial utility weight for income.  
Let jt be the job selection at t, where jt ∈ {E = employment , SE = self 
employment}.  The absolute income is a function of ability and job selection, and it is 
denoted by Y(at,jt), where ∂Y/∂at > 0 (2c) and Y(at,E) < Y(at,SE) (2d).  To model absolute 
income we choose the functional form 
                                                                                                                       (5) 
where β(jt) is the marginal income associated with an increase in ability if job jt is 
selected at t. 
Let w be the disutility weight (i.e., negative utility weight) for (absolute) work 
effort, which increases with age at a decreasing rate (3b) but decreases with ability (3c), 
that is, 
                                                     (6) 
To model the disutility weight for work effort we choose the functional form 
                                                                                                 (7) 
where γw is the final (i.e., an upper bound on the) disutility weight for work effort that is 
due to age, Aw is the initial disutility weight for work effort that is due to ability and δw is 
the marginal disutility-weight reduction for work effort that is due to an increase in 
ability.[3]  The absolute work effort associated with job jt is denoted by W(jt), with W(E) < 
W(SE) (3d). 
Let r be the disutility weight for (absolute) risk, which increases with age at a 
decreasing rate (4b) but decreases with ability (4c), that is, 
                                                        (8) 
To model the disutility weight for risk we choose the functional form 
                                                                                                    (9) 
where γr is the final (i.e., an upper bound on the) disutility weight for risk that is due to 
age, Ar is the initial disutility weight for risk that is due to ability and δr is the marginal 
                                                 
[3] To insure that at any ability level the individual has a disutility from work, 
Aω ισ ασσυμεδ λαργερ τηαν δw (α0+α). 
disutility-weight reduction for risk that is due to an increase in ability.[4]  The absolute 
risk associated with jt is denoted by R(jt), and R(E) < R(SE) (4d).  
Let i be the utility weight for independence, which increases with age at a 
decreasing rate (5b) but increases with ability (5c), that is, 
                                                         (10) 
To model the utility weight for independence we choose the functional form 
                                                                                                             (11) 
where γi is the final (i.e., an upper bound on the) utility weight for independence that is 
due to age and δi is the marginal utility weight for independence that is due to an increase 
in ability.  Independence associated with job jt is denoted by I(jt), with I(E) < I(SE) (5d).   
The objective is to find a career path over time that maximizes utility at any age t 
(which we equate to maximizing total lifetime utility).  The total utility at t associated 
with job jt is expressed by 
                                          (12) 
or, equivalently, by 
      (13) 
An individual is best advise to select self employment at age t rather than 
employment if and only if Ut(SE) > Ut(E), where Ut(SE) - Ut(E) is the change in utility at 
t from selecting self employment over employment.  With Δβ = β(SE)-β(E) (>0), ΔW = 
W(SE)-W(E) (>0), ΔR = R(SE)-R(E) (>0), and ΔI = I(SE)-I(E) (>0), self 
employment is preferred to employment whenever 
                                                 
[4] To insure that at any ability level the individual has a disutility from risk, Ar is assumed 
larger than δr (α0+α). 
(14) 
which is equivalent to 
(15) 
The marginal utility parabola ΔU(e-t) = a⋅ (e-t)2 + b⋅ (e-t) + c  expresses over e-t 
(which can be translated in terms of time t) the change in utility from selecting 
self employment over employment. 
  
MODEL IMPLICATIONS 
We next derive the roots of the quadratic function in  e-t that is given by 
(15).  These two roots are 
                                                                         (16) 
where coefficients a, b and c are as in (15).  These roots exist as long as the discriminant 
(i.e., b2 – 4ac) is non-negative.  When the roots exist and are non-negative, they are 
associated with two critical time points, t* = ln(1/r2) and t** = ln(1/r1).  Since a is always 
negative (and thus the quadratic function expressed by (15) concave in e-t), these roots are 
non-negative whenever b is non-negative and c is non-positive (so that b (>0) > -( b2 – 
4ac)1/2 ).  The critical time periods are finite and positive as long as the roots belong to 
(0,1).  When at least one of the roots is negative (i.e., b < 0 and/or c > 0), the critical time 
points are not well defined, but the optimal career strategy can still be derived.  
We are able to express over time the optimal career strategy based on the change 
in utility of self employment over employment.  When the additional total utility from 
selecting self employment over employment is positive then the person should select self 
employment and if negative should select employment.  More specifically, the additional 
(or change in) utility over e-t from selecting self employment over employment is the 
parabola in (15), and thus the change in utility over time t depends on the roots of the 
parabola, as given by (16).  Since these roots are functions of coefficients a, b, and c, the 
change in utility over time will depend on these coefficients.  
Coefficient -a (a is always negative) is the initial utility from an assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over employment.   The 
maximal (or upper bound) is due to increases in ability that occur with aging.  
Coefficient b is the marginal (w.r.t. e-t) reduction in utility from self employment 
over employment due to the change in decision weights indirectly from aging (via 
increased ability) and directly from aging.  The indirect effect of aging (via increased 
ability) is to increase the utility weight for independence and decrease the disutility 
weights for risk and work.  All the indirect changes of age through ability change the 
decision weights so that they increase the overall utility for self employment.  The direct 
effect of aging on the decision weights is to increase the disutility weights for both risk 
and work and decrease the utility weight for income (decreasing the overall utility for self 
employment), and increase the utility weight for independence (increasing the overall 
utility for self employment).  Therefore, an increase in the overall utility for self 
employment over employment (which is a decrease in coefficient b) indicates that the 
indirect effect of aging (via ability) outweighs the increased disutility arising from the 
direct effect of aging (assuming that the disutilities of risk and work from the direct effect 
of aging outweigh the utilities of income and independence - even though the utility 
weight for income has decreased it still produces utility).  Otherwise, the direct and 
indirect effects are both utilities and increase the probability of self employment. 
Coefficient c is the final (t equals infinity) utility from selecting self employment 
over employment.  Final refers to the end of this person’s career - - the point of 
retirement. 
The combination a + b + c ≡ γyα0Δβ + (δwα0-Aw)ΔW + (δrα0-Ar)ΔR + δiα0ΔI 
represents the initial (t=0 or, equivalently, e-t=1) utility from selecting self employment 
over employment. 
The implications of the model (Cases 1 to 5) are presented in Table 1.  Each case 
is associated with a condition on the sign of the discriminant b2 – 4ac and additional 
conditions on coefficients a, b, and c as it appears in each cell of Table 1.  Appendix A 
offers a diagrammatic representation of Cases 1 to 5 based on these combined conditions 
on the coefficients.  Moreover, for each Case the sign of the additional total utility (ΔU) 
from self employment over employment (with reference to the two critical time 
points that are based on the signs of the two roots) is determined and 
demonstrated in Figures 1 to 11.   
Only when the marginal utility parabola crosses the X-axis can a change in the 
sign of the additional total utility from selecting self employment over employment occur 
- - the discriminant must be non-negative.  For the discriminant to be non-negative the 
final utility from selecting self employment over employment (c) must be greater than or 
equal to -b2/4(-a) which occurs for all cases except 1(c).  For example, the discriminant 
will be non-negative if the final (t equals infinity) utility from selecting self employment 
over employment (c) is positive or zero (because a<0).  Each Case is now described.  
…………………………. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
…………………………. 
  
Career Strategy 1 
In Case 1(a) the final (t equals infinity) utility from selecting self employment 
over employment is zero (c = 0).  The marginal (w.r.t. e-t) reduction in utility from self 
employment over employment due to aging is non-positive (b ≤ 0).  Consequently either 
the two roots given by (16) are zero (when b = 0) or one is zero and the other is negative 
(when b < 0), as demonstrated in Figure 1 and 2, respectively.  Since the function e-t 
increases as t decreases, the figures must be read over time from right to left, that is, from 
t equals zero corresponding to e-t equals 1 to t equals infinity corresponding to e-t equals 
zero.  Hence, in this case, the additional total utility from selecting self employment over 
employment is always negative within the interval (0,1).  Therefore for this type of 
individual there is no age for which it is utility maximizing to choose self employment 
over employment.   
In Case 1(b) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
now negative (c < 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is negative (b < 0).  Consequently the roots in (16) are 
negative.  As demonstrated in Figure 3, the additional total utility from selecting self 
employment over employment is always negative within the interval (0,1) and again it is 
always utility maximizing to be employed. 
In Case 1(c) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
less than b2/4(-a).  Consequently the roots given by (16) do not exist.  As demonstrated in 
Figure 4, the additional total utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
always negative within the interval (0,1).  Again, for this type of individual there is no 
age for which it is utility maximizing to choose self employment over employment. 
In Case 1(d) the initial utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
non-positive (a+b+c ≤ 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is larger than twice the initial utility from an assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over employment (b > -
2a) (consequently, c < 0).  Therefore the two roots in (16) are larger than, or equal to 
1.  As demonstrated in Figure 5, the additional total utility from selecting self 
employment over employment is negative within the interval (0,1), and it is thus utility 
maximizing for this person to initially select employment and remain employed. 
Rationale for Career Strategy 1 is based on case 1(a).  For this group of 
people the effect of aging is to marginally decrease (or to have no effect on) the 
utility to be gained from self employment over employment (with b≤0 the disutility 
from self employment over employment (be-t) increases over time).  This occurs 
because the direct effect of aging has a greater (or equal) influence on their 
overall utility than does the indirect effect of aging via ability.  Specifically, the 
increased disutility weights for risk and work from the direct effect of age match 
or are below the increased utility weight for independence from both the direct 
and indirect effect of aging, the decreased utility from income due to the direct 
effect of aging and the decreased disutility weights for risk and work from the 
indirect effect of aging.  Further, this group of people are indifferent between self 
employment and employment at the end of their careers.  Given the effect of 
aging (increasing the disutility of self employment over employment) and their 
final indifference for self employment over employment it is utility maximizing for 
them to begin and remain in employment for their entire career. 
………………………………. 
Insert Figure 1 to 11 About Here 
………………………………. 
  
Career Strategy 2  
In Case 2(a) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
zero (c = 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over employment 
due to aging is positive, but bounded above (0 < b < -a).  Therefore the smallest root in 
(16) is zero and the other root belongs to (0,1).  As demonstrated in Figure 6, the 
additional total utility from selecting self employment over employment is positive and 
then becomes (and stays) negative within the interval (0,1).  Since the function e-t 
increases as t decreases, it is utility maximizing for this person to select employment until 
a critical time point t* (which exists, is finite and equals ln(1/r2) ) and become self 
employed thereafter.  
In Case 2(b) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
now positive (c > 0) and the marginal loss of utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is less than twice the initial utility from an assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over employment (b < -
2a).  Also, the initial (t=0) utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
negative (a + b + c < 0).  Therefore one root is negative while the other belongs to 
(0,1).  As demonstrated in Figure 7, the additional total utility from selecting self 
employment over employment is positive and then becomes (and stays) negative within 
the interval (0,1).  Therefore the career strategy remains the same as that for case 2a, 
although the value of the critical time point t* will be different as the combination (a,b,c) 
is different. 
Rationale for Career Strategy 2 is based on case 2(a).  For this group of 
people the effect of aging is to marginally increase the utility to be gained from 
self employment over employment (with b>0 the disutility from self employment 
over employment (be-t) decreases over time).  This occurs because the indirect 
effect of aging (via ability) has a greater influence on overall utility than does the 
direct effect of aging.  Specifically, the increased disutility weights for risk and 
work from the direct effect of age match or exceed the increased utility weight for 
independence from both the direct and indirect effect of aging, the decreased 
utility from income due to the direct effect of aging and the decreased disutility 
weights for risk and work from the indirect effect of aging. 
This group of people also have an initial disutility from selecting self employment 
over employment.  This initial disutility means that it is utility maximizing for them to 
begin with employment.  However, the effect of aging (increasing the utility of self 
employment over employment) is sufficient to overcome this initial disutility and it then 
becomes utility maximizing for them to shift to self employment after the critical time 
point. 
  
Career Strategy 3   
In Case 3(a) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
zero (c = 0) and the marginal loss of utility from self employment over employment due 
to aging is greater than or equal to the initial utility from an assessment of the maximum 
difference in income from selecting self employment over employment (b ≥ -
a).  Consequently there is initial utility from selecting self employment over employment 
(a + b + c = a + b ≥ 0).  Therefore one of the two roots in (16) is zero while the other is 
larger than or equal to 1.  As demonstrated in Figure 8, the additional total utility from 
selecting self employment over employment is never negative, and therefore this person 
will maximize utility by being self employed at all stages of their career. 
In Case 3(b) the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
now positive (c > 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is now at least twice the initial utility from an assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over employment (b ≥ -
2a).  As demonstrated in Figure 9, one root is negative and the other is larger than or 
equal to 1.  In Case 3(c) the final utility from selecting self employment over 
employment is still positive (c > 0) although the marginal reduction in utility for self 
employment over employment from aging is now less than twice the initial utility from 
an assessment of the maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over 
employment (b ≥ -2a).  Moreover, there is initial utility from selecting self employment 
over employment (a + b + c ≥ 0, and thus Figure 9 still applies).  Therefore, for cases 3(a), 
3(b) and 3(c), the additional total utility from selecting self employment over 
employment is never negative and this person maximizes utility be choosing, and 
remaining in, self employment. 
Rationale for Career Strategy 3 is based on case 3(a).  As in the rationale for 
career strategy 2, the effect of aging on this group of people is to marginally increase the 
utility gained from self employment over employment.  That is, the indirect effect of 
aging (via ability) has a greater influence on overall utility than does the direct effect of 
aging.  Furthermore, while they are indifferent between self and employment and 
employment at the end of their careers, they obtain utility from self employment over 
employment at the beginning of their careers.  Given this initial utility and the effect of 
aging (increasing the utility of self employment over employment), it is utility 
maximizing for this group of people to begin and then remain in self employment for 
their entire career. 
  
Career Strategy 4 
In Case 4 the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
negative (c < 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is less than twice the initial utility from an assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from selecting self employment over employment (b < -
2a).  Moreover, the initial utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
negative (a+b+c < 0).  Therefore the two roots in (16) belong to (0,1).  As demonstrated 
in Figure 10, the additional total utility from selecting self employment over employment 
is negative, then becomes positive and negative again within the interval (0,1).  It is 
utility maximizing for this person to select employment before the critical time point t* 
and after t**, and be self employed between t* and t** (the critical time points exist, are 
both finite and equal to, respectively, ln(1/r2) and ln(1/r1)). 
Rationale for Career Strategy 4.  As in the rationale for career strategy 2 and 3 
above, the effect of aging on this group of people is to marginally increase the utility to 
be gained from self employment over employment.  That is, the indirect effect of aging 
(via ability) has a greater influence on overall utility than does the direct effect of 
aging.  It is important to note, however, that the upper bound on this marginal increase in 
utility for self employment over employment from aging is lower than in career strategies 
2 and 5. 
Further, these people initially obtain disutility for self employment over 
employment and also at the end of their careers receive disutility from self employment 
over employment.  Given their initial disutility, it is utility maximizing for them to pursue 
employment in the first stage of their career.  However, the effect of aging on their 
decision weights (increasing the utility of self employment over employment) eventually 
results in the utility of self employment over employment exceeding the initial 
disutility.  At this point in time it becomes utility maximizing for them to become self 
employed.  Later in their careers the final disutility for self employment over employment 
exceeds its utility and it again becomes utility maximizing for this group to shift back to 
employment.  Therefore the utility maximizing career path for these people is an initial 
period of employment, then self employment and then finally employment again. 
  
Career Strategy 5 
In Case 5 the final utility from selecting self employment over employment is 
negative (c < 0) and the marginal reduction in utility from self employment over 
employment due to aging is positive (b > 0).  Moreover, the initial utility from selecting 
self employment over employment is positive (a+b+c > 0).  Therefore one root belongs to 
(0,1) while the other is larger than or equal to 1.  As demonstrated in Figure 11, the 
additional total utility from selecting self employment over employment is negative, then 
becomes positive within the remaining of interval (0,1).  Therefore it is utility 
maximizing for this person to select self employment before a critical time point t**, and 
be employed afterwards. 
Rationale for Career Strategy 5.  For this group of people (and those of cases 2, 
3 and 4) the effect of aging is to marginally increase the utility to be gained from self 
employment over employment.  This is due to the indirect effect of aging (via ability) 
having a greater influence on overall utility than does the direct effect of aging.  Further, 
while these people initially obtain utility from self employment over employment they 
receive disutility from self employment over employment at the end of their 
careers.  Given this initial utility and the effect of aging on their utility weights 
(increasing the utility for self employment over employment) it is utility maximizing for 
this group of people to initially be self employed.  However, later in their careers the final 
disutility for self employment over employment exceeds the utility and it becomes utility 
maximizing for them to shift to employment.  Therefore, for this group of people, the 
utility maximizing career path is to begin as self employed and at a critical time point 
shift to being employed for the rest of their careers. 
  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
            A sensitivity analysis is now conducted that increases some of the key parameters 
so that the resultant changes to the career strategy can be determined.  To fully illustrate 
the sensitivity of our dynamic model we conduct the analysis using case 4 - - case 4 has 
two critical time points (i.e., the lower and the upper bounds) and therefore represents the 
case with the most career changes.  A change in a critical time point influences the length 
of a career stage where it is utility maximizing to pursue either self employment or 
employment.  The sensitivity analysis is conducted where  r1 and r2 in (16) are 
differentiated with respect to the key model parameters, where r1 and r2 are functions of a, 
b and c, and these coefficients are in turn functions of the model parameters.  As a 
parameter is increased a negative derivative corresponds to a decrease in the root and thus 
an increase in the corresponding critical time point, whereas a positive derivative 
corresponds to an increase in the root and thus a decrease in the corresponding critical 
time point.  A portion of the technical details is included as appendix B.  Increases in 
parameters and their effect on career strategy are now detailed.  
Parameters: marginal reduction of disutility weight for work (δw) risk (δr) and 
independence (δi) from ability, final utility weight for independence from 
aging (γi), incremental independence from selecting self employment over 
employment (ΔI).  An increase in any one of these parameters increases the 
marginal utility of self employment over employment from aging and decreases 
the final disutility for self employment over employment.  Therefore, with 
increased marginal utility less time is required to exceed the initial disutility for 
self employment over employment (decreasing the lower bound).  Further, with a 
decreased final disutility for self employment over employment it will take longer 
before the final disutility exceeds the utility for self employment over employment 
(increasing the upper bound).  Therefore it is utility maximizing for this group of 
people to decrease the initial career stage of employment, decrease the final 
career stage of employment and increase the middle career stage of self 
employment. 
Parameters: Final disutility weight for work (γw) and risk (γr) from aging, 
incremental work ( ΔW) and risk ( ΔR) from selecting self employment over 
employment.  An increase in any one of these parameters decreases the 
marginal utility for self employment over employment from aging and increases 
the final disutility for self employment over employment.  Therefore, with a 
decreased marginal utility more time is required to exceed the initial disutility for 
self employment over employment (increasing the lower bound).  Further, with an 
increased final disutility for self employment over employment it will take less 
time before the final disutility exceeds the utility for self employment over 
employment (decreasing the upper bound).  Therefore it is utility maximizing for 
this group of people to increase the initial career stage of employment, increase 
the final career stage of employment and decrease the middle stage of self 
employment.  (It must be noted that the above rationale only applies to the 
parameter ΔW if (γw - δwα)r2 < γw + Aw  - δw(α0+α) and (γw - δwα)r1 < γw + Aw  - 
δw(α0+α), and to ΔR if(γr - δrα)r2 < γr + Ar  - δr(α0+α) and (γr - δrα)r1 < γr + Ar  - 
δr(α0+α)).   
Parameters: initial utility weight from income (γy) and incremental income from 
self employment over employment (Δβ).  An increase in either of these 
parameters decreases the initial disutility for self employment over employment 
(i.e., increases the initial utility since ∂(a+b+c)/∂γy = α0Δβ > 0 and ∂(a+b+c)/∂Δβ  = 
γyα0 > 0), increases the initial utility received from the assessment of the 
maximum difference in income from self employment over employment, and 
decreases the marginal utility of self employment over employment from 
aging.  Despite a decrease in the marginal utility for self employment over 
employment the reduction in initial disutility is such that less time is required to 
exceed this reduced initial utility for self employment over employment 
(decreasing the lower bound).  Further, with an increased initial utility from their 
assessment of the maximum difference in income from self employment over 
employment it will take longer before the final disutility exceeds the utility for self 
employment over employment (increasing the upper bound).  Therefore it is utility 
maximizing for this group of people to decrease the initial career stage of 
employment, decrease the final career stage of employment and increase the 
middle career stage of self employment.   
Parameters: initial disutility weight for work effort (Aw) and risk (Ar) from 
ability.  An increase in either of these parameters increases the initial disutility for 
self employment over employment (∂(a+b+c)/∂Aw = -ΔW <0 and ∂(a+b+c)/∂Ar = -
ΔR < 0) and increases the final disutility for self employment over 
employment.  Therefore, with an increase in the initial disutility for self 
employment over employment more time is required to exceed the initial disutility 
for self employment over employment (increasing the lower bound).  Further, with 
an increased final disutility for self employment over employment it will take less 
time before the final disutility exceeds the utility for self employment over 
employment (decreasing the upper bound).  Therefore it is utility maximizing for 
this group of people to increase the initial career stage of employment, increase 
the final career stage of employment and decrease the middle stage of self 
employment.   
Parameter: Initial ability (α0).   An increase in this parameter decreases the 
initial disutility for self employment over employment (∂(a+b+c)/∂α0 = 
γyΔβ+δwΔW+δrΔR+δiΔI > 0), decreases the marginal utility for self employment 
over employment from aging and decreases the final disutility for self 
employment over employment.  Therefore, despite a decrease in the marginal 
utility for self employment over employment from aging the decrease in the initial 
utility is such that less time is required for the marginal utility for self employment 
over employment to accumulate and exceed the initial disutility for self 
employment over employment (decreasing the lower bound).  Further, with a 
decreased final utility for self employment over employment it will take longer 
before the final disutility exceeds the utility for self employment over employment 
(increasing the upper bound).  Therefore it is utility maximizing for this group of 
people to decrease the initial career stage of employment, decrease the final 
career stage of employment and increase the middle career stage of self 
employment.   
CONCLUSION 
In this article we offer a dynamic model of career choice between self employment and 
employment.  The model acknowledges that people differ in terms of their attitudes 
(utility or disutility weights) towards job attributes and this impacts their career 
choice.  The model further incorporates the knowledge that as people age their attributes 
change.  Therefore, we argue that people differ in terms of their: (a) initial utility for self 
employment over employment, (b) initial utility from the assessment of the maximum 
difference in income for self employment over employment, (c) marginal reduction in 
utility for self employment over employment from aging and (d) final utility for self 
employment over employment.  These differences between people result in different 
optimal career strategies.  Five optimal career strategies were offered. 
The model and its five career strategies make an important contribution to both 
the entrepreneurship and career literatures - - we now have an explanation for why people 
change from employment to self employment or self employment to employment and 
when this might occur. 
While the emphasis on this paper has been the change of utility weights from 
aging, we believe that a career path is not predetermined - - utility weights can be 
changed by factors other than age.  Attitudes can be learned and therefore those entities 
trying to encourage people to be self employed would be well advised to understand how 
utility weights change over time and also how education and other environmental factors 
can mold attitudes.  Scholars can help increase our understanding in this area. 
There is a number of other research opportunities that arise from the model 
presented in this article.  First, the assumptions underlying the model are based on 
intentions research that demonstrate attitudes effect intention and intentions influence 
behavior.  However, it must be noted that while a person might have the utility weights 
that would suggest that it is utility maximizing to be self employed, they also need the 
opportunity and the resources to realize that intention.  Therefore, the above model 
assumes that given an intention the necessary opportunity and resources are 
available.  Future research can incorporate opportunity and resources into this dynamic 
model of career choice.  For example, one aspect of ability could be opportunity 
recognition and as we mature our ability to perceive opportunities might increase.  This 
increased ability to recognize opportunities will likely have an impact on a person’s 
optimal career path.   
Second, another assumption of the model is that income is higher for self 
employment than for employment.  While this is often the case there are circumstances 
when a person might pursue a self employment opportunity that produces lower income 
than employment (e.g., lifestyle businesses).  Under such circumstances the ‘marginal 
utility’ parabola becomes positive and is flipped over offering a different perspective on 
optimal career paths. 
Finally, there is also an opportunity to empirically test this dynamic model.  There 
are already well established surveys for capturing attitudes and intentions (e.g., Cable and 
Judge 1996).  Such research could build on this model and further increase our 
understanding of how utility weights change over time and how this influences which 
career we choose and when.  This represents an important research agenda for 
entrepreneurship and career scholars. 
Appendix A  -  Optimal Employment Strategies  
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Appendix B  -  Sensitivity Analysis 
  
We illustrate our derivations for the sensitivity analysis with the initial utility 
weight from income (γy).  From the chain rule, 
, 
which is negative (so that t** = ln(1/r1) increases) if and only if  
                             (B1) 
Since for any parabola f(x) = ax2 + bx + c with roots r1 and r2 one has -b/a = r1 + r2 and 
c/a = r1r2, (B1) holds whenever 
Similarly, 
, 
which is positive (so that t* = ln(1/r2) decreases) if and only if 
            The remaining derivations are conducted in a similar fashion. 
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Table 1  Optimal Employment Strategies 
b2 – 4ac < 
0 
Career: employment at any age (1c) 
r1   
b2 – 4ac ≥ 
0 
≤ 0 ∈ (0,1) ≥ 1 
  
  
≤ 0 
Conditions: • c=0 and b≤0 
(1a); or 
• c<0 and b<0 
(1b) 
  
Career: employment at any age
    
  
  
  
  
∈ (0,1) 
Conditions: • c=0, b>0 and 
a+b<0 (2a); or 
• c>0, b<-2a and 
a+b+c<0 (2b) 
  
Career: employment on (0, t*), 
self employment 
otherwise, where 
t*=ln(1/r2) 
Conditions: c<0, 0<b<-2a and 
a+b+c<0 (4) 
  
Career: self employment on (t*, 
t**), employment 
otherwise, where t* = 
ln(1/r2) and  
t** = ln(1/r1) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
r2
  
  
  
  
≥ 1 
Conditions: • c=0 and a+b≥0 
(3a); or 
• c>0 and b≥-2a 
(3b); or 
• c>0, b<-2a, and 
a+b+c≥0 (3c) 
  
Career: self employment at any 
age 
Conditions:  c<0, b>0 and 
a+b+c>0 (5) 
  
Career: self employment on (0, 
t**), employment 
otherwise, where t** = 
ln(1/r1) 
Conditions: b>-2a 
and 
a+b+c≤
0 (1d) 
  
Career: employment 
at any age 
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